. He was instrumental in founding the Indianapolis affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)-some in the Indianapolis legal community believed that the ACLU was connected to communism, but Mr. Miller and his firm believed that the ACLU was good for the law profession and the community they served. Ice Miller, L.L.P., Firm History, http://www.icemiller.com/firm_history.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). Mr. Miller and his firm partner Harry Ice were both Eagle Scouts, and they founded the I and M Firesets Company to manufacture and sell flint and steel fire starting kits to Boy Scouts. The company was later passed down through the hands of various scouts and troop leaders in Indianapolis. Id. at http://www.icemiller.com/news/100YearFacts.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). . 25 Cahn et al., supra note 2 at 10 (Mr. Tarleau contributed a paper to the symposium entitled "Ethical Problems in Dealing with Treasury Representatives). 26 Practice (1965) . For tax lawyers, Professor Bittker needs no footnoted introduction. He wrote over 100 articles and at least 15 books. However, his focus was always on his students. At one point he even told the Shah of Iran that he could not work on his tax case, no matter what Many of these writers were also significantly involved in government, politics, and the social and legal movements of the day: Randolph E. Paul was one of the most influential tax advisors to President Roosevelt, arguing the adoption of a Keynesian approach to regulating the economy through tax policy (and dying while testifying before a Congressional tax committee, complaining of Eisenhower's tax policies); 32 Norris Darrell was president of the American Law Institute for 15 years and also worked on the groundwork for the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; 33 Mortimer M. Caplin was the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service under John F. Kennedy, during a time of significant tax reform;
34 Dean Erwin N. Griswold joined the Lyndon B. Johnson administration as Solicitor General, and then continued as Solicitor General in the Richard M. Nixon administration, eventually arguing over 100 cases before the Supreme Court (including the Pentagon Papers case); 35 Merle H. Miller was a founder of the American Civil Liberties Union in Indianapolis; 36 Adrian DeWind was a founder of Human Rights Watch and served on the boards of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Coalition Against Censorship and the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control; 37 Professor Boris Bittker was a Trustee with the Natural Resources Defense Council; 38 
B. PHILOSOPHICAL PROFESSIONALISM
The tax bar of this time evidenced a remarkable philosophical sensitivity. In 1949, for example, the Committee on State and Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law issued a report on the importance of natural law for tax jurisprudence. 39 The report began:
[T]axation both in its purpose and its method, is at once a function of government, and, under a philosophy of government by law rather than by men, a process of law. As a function of government, taxation, therefore, of necessity finds roots and justification in the philosophy of government. As a process of law by which it, as a function of the pay, until after the current semester. He began his teaching career at Yale Law School only four years after graduating from the school. Professor Bittker was also an environmentalist who served many years as a Trustee with the Natural Resources Defense Council, an avid adventurer, and tremendous photographer. See Yale Law Report, Boris I. Bittker 1916 Bittker -2005 , available at http://www.law.yale.edu/YLR/pdfs/v53-1/531bittker.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) . 32 See Paul, supra note 20. 33 See Darrell, supra note 23. 34 See Caplin, supra note 21. 35 "Obituary:
Erwin N. Griswold; Former Solicitor General," L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 1994 available at http://articles.latimes.com/1994-11-21/news/mn-65525_1_solicitor-general (last visited May 16, 2011). 36 See Darrell, supra note 23. 37 See supra note 24. 38 See Bittker, supra note 31. 39 government, is exercised, it of necessity finds its roots and justification in the philosophy of law. 40 Having framed taxation between philosophy of government and philosophy of law, the report continued that "tax laws must of necessity be subject to, and limited by, certain basic underlying moral principles by virtue of our American philosophy of government and law," which the report identified as "the unchanging principles of natural law." 41 The report then works-out implications of these moral principles, such as taxes only being rightfully imposed to secure material, spiritual, and social rights of the governed, and that in "imposing taxes, a due proportion to the wealth of each citizen must be observed, as distributive justice demands, so that the burden will not exceed the resources of the individual and he will be proportionately compensated by the services which come to the people from the tax money." 42 The impetus for this report appears to have been concern about the influences of legal realism, which "conceives the law to be the rule of conduct in specific situations by our courts and based upon the court's interpretation of the feelings, morals and other standards of conduct" then prevailing in the community. 43 The committee warned that legal realism was contrary to natural law, and that it elevated the authority of courts at the expense of the authority of "the Supreme Lawgiver, man's Creator." 44 The tax bar's philosophical orientation was broader than philosophy of law. This broad interest was on full display at the 1952 Tax Law Review banquet, which was dedicated to discussing "Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners." The discussion began with topics such as preparing corporate records to justify accumulating earnings to expand the business (when that purpose for accumulation may have been more the lawyer's idea than the client's) but developed into an argument over whether or not "our generation is worse or better than previous generations have been." 45 Thomas N. Tarleau maintained that Americans were not "in a more degenerate age" but merely "a more self-conscious age," while Professor Edmond Cahn maintained that Americans of the day were too "outer-directed," insufficiently "innerdirected," and generally too conformists with "an obsessive need to be like everyone else." 46 In good law professor style, Dean Miguel A. de Capriles (New York University) framed another argument of the evening as "the problem of obedience to the unjust law," questioning the tax lawyers-without explanation or follow-up-with "it seems to me that we are taking for granted, are we not, that the Socratic answer is still the right one?" 47 That the there would be a banquet discussion on the ethical problems of tax practitioners evidences the concern these men had for the state of their profession in 1952. If "civic and moral obligations were being fulfilled currently to even a reasonably satisfactory extent, they would not have played so a significant part in the discussion" at the banquet. 48 On the one hand, there was concern as to 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 10-11. 43 Id. at 10. 44 Id. at 10. 45 Cahn et al, supra note 2 at 15 (remarks of Bruno Schachner (Assistant U.S. Attorney)). 46 Id. at 2, 9, 10. 47 Id. at 23 (statement of Miguel A. De Capriles, Dean at New York University School of Law, at the symposium). 48 Cahn et al., supra note 28 at 18 widespread ethical failures among tax lawyers 49 but, on the other hand, there was comfort in the progressing ethical sensitivity of lawyers-or at least an increase in their discussions of ethics. 50 Professor John Potts Barnes characterized the increase as a "sudden burst of interest in the tax lawyer's ethics." 51 He wondered if this burst was a passing fad of the sort that often makes the rounds of lawyers meetings, 52 a reflection of great failings among tax lawyers, or a reflection of a more general "awakening of lawyers generally to the need . . . for shoring up the ethical foundations of the profession."
53 He decided, however, the burst of interest in tax lawyer's ethics was due to "the realization . . . of the special significance of the tax lawyer's ethical standard," especially in a voluntary assessment system.
54
There was a chorus of calls for greater definition of the tax lawyer's ethical standard. Mortimer Caplin described the need for "authoritative guidance in prelitigation tax practice," including an identification of "practices which, though not necessarily in technical violation of an ethical code are . . . looked upon . . . as 'things that are not done.'" 55 Norris Darrell was comforted by the increase in legal ethics discussions at conferences and by committees, and hoped the tax bar would become more involved. 56 Professor John Maguire (Harvard) had a more specific hope: for the full connotations of the tax lawyer's special obligations to be "spelled out" by a bar committee; 57 that is, for the tax bar to be given "marching orders" in "a number of commonplace situations produced by tax practice."
58
The concern for the ethical well-being of the tax bar was not limited to committee-crafted solutions to commonplace situations, however. There was a concern that deeper problems were eroding the profession. Sensitive to the increasing time and energy required to be expanded by tax lawyers, Professor Cahn bemoaned the "steady-flowing river of texts, services, and articles" about taxation that "any tax expert, who is unfortunately required to earn his living while trying to maintain his expertness" must read in order to keep up-to-date. 59 Worse, he feared that lawyers were becoming the "jackals of the bourgeoisie," desiring only to "live the same lives, obtain for their wives the same type of coats, and ride around in the same automobiles" as their "mercantile neighbors." 60 When arguing that "we may be fast 49 52 Describing fads in subjects discussed at legal conferences, he wrote "I have observed that a subject considered a lively one for discussion at one tax conference is not unlikely to appear on the program of another and another and to be written about until it has lost the appeal of both novelty and timeliness." Id. I suppose this is as true today as then. 53 Id. losing our status as a profession and becoming nothing more than skilled merchant-clerks," 61 he thought this loss followed the loss of the sense of "moral responsibility" and "civic nobility." 62 He described the deeper problem as lawyers succumbing to an emerging "obsessive need" in American culture to "be like everyone else, to have the same possessions as everyone else, and to follow the same pattern in the pursuit of material goods." 63 The result was that as lawyers gave into this consumerism, its mentality would transform them into being "what the communists have always said lawyers were in a capitalist society:" jackals of the bourgeoisie.
64
C. PATRIOTISM Nineteen fifty-two was the year of the philosophically reflective Tax Law Review banquet, and also a year in which the Cold War was heated-it involved large scale bombing in Korea (the armistice came in 1953) and the communistic threat was on the minds of Americans. In Professor Cahn's mind, individuality, moral responsibility, and civic nobility buttressed lawyer professionalism against the potentially accurate criticisms of the communists.
Merle H. Miller sounded a very similar tone, praising an intentional and international movement of "Moral Re-armament" as perhaps "the most potent challenge to Communism in the struggle for men's minds" and framed moral appeals to fidelity to the tax law in this context. 65 To Mr. Miller, the time was one in which there was a "great battle between the West and East" in which good tax lawyers contributed "greatly to the well being of the country at large" by "kill[ing] off bad tax schemes." 66 In this time of great battle, he did not think any tax lawyer wanted to be known for drafting minutes giving "reasons for not paying out dividends" or writing "long instruments setting up tricky trusts." 67 For Mr. Miller, the risk that American capitalism might fail in this great battle was real, and it was the touchstone for developing sound tax law ethics:
We are engaged in a most challenging economic struggle. Before too many years will be answered the question as to which economic system is more efficient, that in which the properties are owned by the government and operated by government employees, or that in which the people own the sources of production, the factories, the distribution facilities, and from these sources of wealth chip in their share toward assembling resources to be used for the common defense and general welfare of the people. It is the 61 Id. 62 Id. at 3. 63 Id. at 2. 64 Id. 65 M. Miller, supra note 22 at 1068. The reference to "Moral Re-armament" appears to be to the group begun by American Lutheran minister Frank Buchman, which is now known as the Initiatives of Change International. Mr. Buchman's philosophy of moral awakening was very influential at this time. Though not much discussed today, the organization was very active at the end of World War II, but may be best known today for its connections with the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous. system of taxation which supplies the very life blood of the government operating under the latter system . . . . 68 Mr. Miller characterized the situation as "the present emergency," and thought a tax lawyer ought to "do his best to maintain in his fellow citizens a proper respect for the methods we have set up under a democratic system for the collection of each citizen's share" of the burden of responding to the emergency. 69 Merle H. Miller believed that despite feeling that he was personally "carrying the full brunt of our defense effort" by paying large tax liabilities, "I can pay the full liability as shown, with even some concessions in the knowledge that a great deal more would not be an overpayment for the privilege of American citizenship." 70 (Anecdotal evidence suggests that some clients may have felt similarly.)
71
Dean Griswold compared the need for increased revenue during the Cold War to the need for increased revenue during the "past ten years . . . devoted to protecting us against Nazi aggression," concluding that there were no expenditures Americans could make that would "benefit us more than that we pay to the Government in taxes [.] " 72 Indeed, he wrote that "taxation is a benefit, not a curse" in that it finances our organized society, and that rather than "groaning about the burden of taxation" on our money we should remember that we would not have had money, had it not been for what taxes finance. 73 During this threat to national security, it was important to remember the benefits of taxation, he argued because "the present state of the world, and the need for protecting ourselves from the threats directed at our society," meant an increased tax burden, and the prospect of keeping the war (and communism) localized meant that it would be cheaper to pay "its cost currently, and we will be better off in the long run if we do." 74 He was worried that in the "midst of a real shooting war" in Korea, the unfairness of the tax law would be increased through "loopholes and special privileges" and "handouts," such as those for the "oil and gas interests." 75 The need for high tax burden and the unfairness of its distribution prompted Dean Griswold to argue that tax lawyers had a "public responsibility" to work to ensure that the tax burden was distributed fairly.
76
He lamented the tax bar's failures with this responsibility during this threat to the national security.
77
Other writers also referenced the Cold War in the tax ethics context, such as Mortimer Caplin who pointed out that "our strength as a nation is dependent upon our ability, year after year, to raise many billions of dollars," much of which was specifically for the sound financing of "our defense programs" 68 Id. at 1082-83. 69 Id. at 1083. 70 (1950) . In reflecting on the Supreme Court's tax jurisprudence during the war against Nazi aggression, it is interesting that he concluded the Court favored the Government in those in some part "because there was a war on." Id. at 1000. 73 Id., at 1002. 74 Id., at 1002. 75 Id. at 1057. 76 Id. at 1057. 77 Id. at 1057.
and "missile and space programs."
78 But the privileges of American citizenship listed were not limited to personal safety but, according to Dean Griswold effectively financing collective improvements to that society, 79 and, more specifically by another writer: "social security, unemployment insurance, four-lane highways, and other blessings of modern government." 80 Merle H. Miller directly connected the efforts of revenue agents with those who work on "the assembly lines where are built the rockets and missiles to provide our security" and "those in the armed forces," writing that it is the revenue agents who are responsible for securing the funds to pay the assembly workers and armed forces members. 81 Robert N. Miller echoed this characterization writing that the agents were "patriotic" and "sustained in their work by a justifiable pride in their organization." 82 He pointed out that it was a "vital duty of the Treasury . . . to maintain dignity and self-respect in this body of men on whom the government must rely for every dollar of the government's revenue." 83 On the one hand was a theme of characterizing the revenue agents as important enlistees in the Cold War, since it was their work collecting the funds that made possible the government's spending the funds, but, on the other hand, the need to police a mass tax touched concerns especially acute during the Cold War. Both Robert N. Miller and Norris Darrell thought it was very important that tax administration be conducted without descent into a "terrorizing" or "police state" mentality on behalf of the revenue agents, further reflecting Cold War distinctions between the U.S. and communist regimes.
84 Mortimer Caplin expressed concern that "the huge sums needed to finance our Government" be raised without violating our "democratic traditions." 85 And Professor Boris Bittker raised the fear of "Big Brother," warning that too close a sympathy for the revenue-collecting necessities may lead to the belief that the Treasury Department "represents 'all of us' and hence embodies a virtue superior to any of us." 86 D.
DUTY TO THE SYSTEM Is the tax lawyer a special species of lawyer, one with special duties not shared by other lawyers? The legal ethics writers in this time wrote of tax lawyers' "duties," "roles," "relationships," "responsibilities," "loyalties," and "obligations" 87 owed to clients, as well as those owed to the "government," the "Treasury," "our government and its agents," the "public interest," the "country," "society," the "state," "other taxpayers," "professional responsibility," "public responsibility," and the 78 Caplin, supra note 55 at 9. 79 Id., at 1002. 80 88 Some writers described the tax lawyer as having a "double" or "dual" sets of duties (e.g., "dual responsibility to his client and the government"), but at least one described a "triple" set of responsibilities. 89 While the discussion was generally limited to "our" government, a question was raised as to whether or not the same duty owed to "our" government was also owed to other governments. 90 Professor Jerome Hellerstein premised his description of a tax lawyer's duty to the system on denying that the citizen's relationship to his government was comparable to a plaintiff's adversarial relationship with a defendant. 91 Professor Hellerstein argued that a citizen owes "his government and his neighbors" the duty of paying his share of taxes, even though doing so may get him labeled as a "sucker" in the business community. 92 He argued that tax lawyers "owe to our Government and to ourselves" the use of "our skill and experience and the great confidence which our clients repose in us" to improve the "tax morality of the community." 93 Professor Hellerstein's objective for tax lawyers was to develop a sense in the general community and in clients specifically that citizens should pay their share of taxes. Specifically, he argued for developing "general ethical standards which require full and ethical disclosure by the taxpayer [and] which abhor fraud, whether obvious or cloaked in elegantly drawn documents or befuddled by the stretching of judgments or the magnifying of doubts."
94 He described this duty as the need to "curb the excesses of the businessmen whom we represent." 95 He suggested these ethical standards were necessary to avoid "moral schizophrenia or chaos." 96 He also thought that accomplishing this goal would require tax lawyers to change their sense of duty, at least in some particulars, but that doing so would lead to tax lawyers living "happier lives," as well as to a "fairer distribution of tax results." 97 Professor Hellerstein's references to disclosure and fraud, as well as his desire to enlist tax lawyers to improve tax morale, indicated that his understanding of the duty to the system was oriented primarily on the duty to undermine abuses and evasion. The duty to the system, in his mind, was the duty 88 E.g., "government" was used by Mark Johnson to refrain from acts such as backdating documents or advising clients to take unauthorized deductions 98 -activities that he thought were "widespread."
99 Thus, while he argued for a duty to the system, other than the duty to improve tax morale, the duties he had in mind were not clearly beyond those applicable to all lawyers.
Professor John M. Maguire separated the tax lawyer's duties into two categories. The first category consisted of duties applicable to tax controversies handled by the courts. When tax controversies reached the courts, tax lawyers had "few if any ethical problems differing from those encountered by trial lawyers generally." 100 The second category consisted of tax controversies prior to their submission to the courts. With these matters, tax lawyers had a "double responsibility," one to the client and one to the public interest.
101 Professor Maguire did not attempt to explicate the details of these "additional obligations" on tax lawyers, but instead called for the full connotations of these obligations to be "spelled out," perhaps, by a committee of the American Bar Association Section of Taxation. 102 He did not consider this to be a speculative matter, but instead a specific derivation of guidance from the general standards of Circular 230. 103 While he was mostly concerned for a "systematic" approach to be articulated by a bar committee, he also thought individuals and firms should consider framing their own code for navigating their obligations.
104
Professor Maguire premised the defense of tax lawyers' special obligations on the idea that the revenue system simply required "a high degree of acquiescence and cooperation from taxpayers and their experts." 105 In other words, in his view, the need to have a "proper pattern" for tax lawyer conduct was related to the income tax being "a system of voluntary compliance" 106 with the details of these duties being grounded in the Treasury Department's regulation of tax lawyers.
107 Professor Maguire's concern with the duty to the system was not related to philosophical reflections on tax lawyering, but instead related to the tax bar's need for "marching orders" in "a number of commonplace situations produced by tax practice." 108 Thomas N. Tarleau characterized the ethical problems encountered by tax lawyers as "largely the same as those of any lawyer dealing with an adversary."
109 He wrote that no lawyer, including a tax lawyer, is entitled to engage in "trickery" or make false statements or misrepresentations.
110 Every adversarial conflict in the legal system brings into tension the lawyer's responsibility to his client and "his 98 Id. at 5, 7. 99 Id. at 5. 100 Maguire, supra note 26 at 30. 101 Id. at 44. 102 Id. at 48. 103 Id. 104 Id. at 46. 105 Id. at 45. 106 Id. at 28. 107 Id. at 45. 108 Id. 109 Cahn et al., supra note 2 at 10. 110 Id.
ethical responsibilities as a member of the bar," and so, in large part, the same responsibilities that are generally applicable to lawyers cover the ethical problems raised in tax practice. 111 However, Mr. Tarleau argued that tax lawyers are special in two ways. First, tax lawyers always have the same party on the other side: the Treasury Department.
112 Second, tax lawyers are also enrolled members of the Treasury Department's bar. 113 One of the most striking consequences of this distinctiveness is that unlike other lawyers who are "free to furnish facts or refuse to furnish them" to litigation adversaries, Mr. Tarleau believed that the Treasury Department is entitled to all pertinent information and the tax lawyer is obligated to provide it. 114 There is no tactical choice available on providing information. This means, he thought, that the tax lawyer always has "an obligation to engage in open-handed dealing with the representatives of the Department" when it came to the facts. 115 He believed such an obligation was sensible because the taxpayer has sole "control of the facts."
116
There are limits and complications to disclosure, of course. Mr. Tarleau considered the limits of disclosure provided by the attorney-client privilege, but also situations in which he argued the privilege is not available, such as return preparation.
117 He also emphasized the threshold issue of determining whether or not particular facts are "material" and must be disclosed or "merely evidentiary" and accordingly need not be disclosed. 118 Thus, while Mr. Tarleau argued that a general obligation to disclose facts to the Treasury Department makes the practice of tax law inherently distinctive, he did not conclude this was a blanket obligation.
Merle H. Miller premised the tax lawyer's duty to the system on patriotism. He wrote that a tax lawyer owes a great duty the country that has educated him, and made possible his present success. He must do his best to maintain in his fellow citizens a proper respect for the methods we have set up under a democratic system for the collection of each citizen's share to meet the present emergency [i.e., the Cold War.] He must inculcate in each citizen a respect for the system, and a proper respect for the part which honesty plays in the system. It is an awesome responsibility. Pray God that we may have the moral caliber to meet it. 119 111 Id. 112 Id. at 13. 113 Id. at 10. 114 Id. at 11, 13. 115 Id. at 12. 116 Id. He also argued that a lawyer taking care to deliver the pertinent facts and vouch for their accuracy "insures and protects his own most available asset -his good reputation." Id. at 13. Query the relevance of the professional reputation of the attorney. This is his goodwill. It benefits all of his clients. However, there may be a conflict between his clients. By disclosing unfavorable facts in one client's situation, the lawyer may thereby purchase a greater goodwill with the agent who may help with other clients but the disclosure will hurt this one. 117 Id. at 14. 118 Id. at 11. 119 M. Miller, supra note 22 at 1083.
Mr. Miller waxed eloquently about the duty to avoid "aiding and abetting taxpayers in their suspicion, distrust [,] and even animosity toward those who are writing and enforcing our tax laws." 120 He understood why a "layman" might interpret particular applications of the tax law as arbitrary, and thus the tax lawyer "who should be seeing the overall picture with its many insolvable problems" ought to increase the layman's respect for the system. 121 He thought that a lawyer in another field may be permitted to "indulge himself in the luxury of agreeing with his client as to everything the client said about the opposing party," but this indulgence is not available to the tax lawyer.
122 Instead, the tax lawyer is obligated to correct his client's misconceptions of the system, urging on the client not only respect for the system but an appreciation of the importance of honesty in their compliance with the system. 123 Mr. Miller described the American system as "an honor system," that was necessary to supply the "very life blood of the government" as it engaged in the struggle against communism.
124 For Mr. Miller, the tax lawyer's duty to "our government and its agents" was the duty to encourage honesty and compliance in taxpayers, a duty which was especially important given the Cold War's demands. 125 Mr. Miller's philosophy of tax lawyering did not merely emphasize the duty of tax lawyers and taxpayers to the government, but also highlighted the "moral obligations owing by taxpayers one to another, because of their reciprocal positions as taxpayers."
126 Stressing that "no taxpayer lives alone," he noted that "most of us recognize a duty, whether or not enacted into law, to govern our acts with due regard to the effect which our conduct may have on others." 127 Mr. Miller was especially concerned with how the acts of taxpayers "affect other taxpayers favorably or adversely."
128
He described the consequences of these acts in several situations, such as how a taxpayer's experience with a revenue agent may in large part reflect that revenue agent's experience with other taxpayers. 129 If a revenue agent has been dealing with a very resistant taxpayer, he will have one sort of attitude, but if the revenue agent has been dealing with a "victim" who gave up some "absurd concession," he will have quite another attitude.
130
Another example noted by Mr. Miller was how taxpayers affect one another by using overworked gimmicks. 131 The effect of these acts is such that we should realize that "most of our woes are brought upon us not by the original voluntary acts of Congress or the dyspepsia of the Revenue Agent, but as the inevitable result of fellow taxpayers who took a good thing too far . . . ." 132 Mr. Miller emphasized that when it comes to "pick[ing] up any part of the tab," the "government" is not a taxpayer. 133 There are no cases in which the government is one side with all the taxpayers in 120 Id. at 1081. 121 Id. different situations on the other. 134 Rather, in any case, there is one taxpayer on one side and all the other taxpayers on the other.
135 A "victory" for "the taxpayers" is one in which the tax burden is to be shared equitably; a defeat is one in which "one class [of taxpayers] is going to get by for less." 136 Norris Darrell phrased his conception of the special duties of a tax lawyer in terms of "certain social responsibilities," including "the duty, putting it baldly, to help make our self-assessing income tax system work; and the duty . . . to lend . . . one's special talents and experiences to . . . improving that system in the public interest."
137 He believed a tax lawyer has a duty to his client and "a duty to live up to his professional responsibility." He believed this was necessary to the success of the voluntary compliance system, and thus necessary to avoid "police state methods" in tax collection. 140 He encouraged tax lawyers to help their clients understand the "public policy reasons underlying the tax rules affecting them . . . ."
141 He thought this encouragement would help clients understand the moral implications of what they do, and develop more far-sighted judgments on tax matters. 142 He argued that "ethical propriety and legal effectiveness in tax planning shade into one another," frequently resulting in the ethically questionable plan being also practically questionable. 143 Mr. Darrell charged each tax lawyer with "a further duty, namely, a duty to do what he can to help make the tax law more fair, practical and equitable and to improve its administration."
144 He encouraged each tax lawyer to "speak out" as a citizen using his expertise to improve the tax system, "whatever the immediate effect upon his client's pocketbook may be."
145 While emphasizing that the lawyer advocating for change in the system was not working on behalf of a client, he pointed out that "clients usually understand this" and respect it. 146 He did not consider the duty to work to improve the system (even with a cost to the client) to be inconsistent with the duty to give "full devotion" to his client. 147 Even as Mr. Darrell affirmed that a tax client facing the Treasury Department as his adversary is entitled to expect the same from his lawyer as a criminal defendant facing prosecution, he expressed 134 Id. at 6-7. 135 Id. 136 Id. at 7. 137 Darrell, supra note 84 at 2. 138 Bittker, supra note 31at 95. This chapter of Professor Bittker's book was a transcription of the first in a series of five talks on "Lawyers' Problems of Conscience," sponsored by the Harvard Student Bar Association, in which Mr. Darrell gave a talk entitled "Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice." Id. at 87. 139 Darrell, supra note 84 at 23. 140 Id. 141 Bittker, supra note 31 at 101. 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Darrell, supra note 84 at 24. 145 Bittker, supra note 31 at 102. 146 Id. at 102, 103. 147 Darrell, supra note 84 at 22. uncertainty about "everyday administrative tax practice."
148 He described this situation as "perplexing, and one especially in need of further study and clarification," specifically the question of whether the tax lawyer owed greater or lesser duties to the Treasury Department than he would a court. 149 Mr. Darrell expressed doubts about the possibilities of a neat and categorical resolution of this particular issue, but had no doubts that tax lawyers had social responsibilities to educate their clients on the importance of ethics in the voluntary compliance system, as well as being involved in other ways to improve the system. Even among those writers who did not directly address the theoretical aspects of a general duty to the system, there were several who, like Merle H. Miller and Norris Darrell insisted on the duty to educate clients on the ethics of tax compliance and the duty to avoid characterizing the IRS as an unreasonable adversary applying arbitrary rules. Agreement on this specific duty to the system was voiced by Boston tax lawyer H. Brian Holland (Ropes and Gray), 150 Regional Commissioner Dean J. Barron, 151 Mortimer M. Caplin, 152 and Robert N. Miller.
153
Like Mr. Darrell, Professor Boris I. Bittker made clear that he considered a tax client and a criminal defense client to be in the same situation-having the government as an adversary and a lawyer who should be devoted to him. 154 He did not think that tax practice was special as a consequence of the government being on the other side. Nor did he think that being a member of the Treasury Bar should dilute a lawyer's obligation to his client. 155 On the contrary, he suggested it was all the more important to be independent. He wrote "there is a shadow of Big Brother . . . in these suggestions that the lawyer has special obligations to the Treasury because it regulates his admission to practice or because it represents 'all of us' and hence embodies a virtue superior to any of us." 156 He insisted that while "[t]he adversary system of administering governmental rules and regulation unquestionably has its drawbacks[,]" the right of citizens to deal with the government at arm's length had such important advantages that it should not be abandoned.
157
Professor Bittker did not think tax practice was a special kind of legal practice.
158 He considered the debate over a special duty to the system to be academic, arguing that those who stress the lawyer's duty to the client still believe the lawyer cannot engage in fraud and those who stress the lawyer's duty to the government do not believe the lawyer must completely open his files to the government. 159 He thought that agreement on the issues was to be found in specific situations, not general propositions. 160 Personally, he believed that the ethics rules common to all lawyers, and statutory requirements such as a 148 Id. 149 Id. at 22-23. 150 Caplin, supra note 85 at 34. 151 Id. 152 Id. 153 Cahn et al., supra note 28 at 9 154 Bittker, supra note 31 at 267. 155 Id. at 268. 156 Id. 157 Id. at 270. 158 Id. at 274. 159 Id. at 268. 160 Id.
tax return "being verified under penalties of perjury," were sufficient to guide ethical tax practice and therefore there was no need to conjure special duties in an attempt to do so. 161 Randolph E. Paul staked-out a position similar to that taken by Professor Bittker. He framed the question in terms of whether or not Circular 230 provides "a standard of conduct different from that which binds the general practitioner representing clients in private litigations," 162 much like Professor Maguire had framed it. 163 Although at one time Mr. Paul had claimed there were special obligations on the tax lawyer, he later was content to claim that it "is far from clear."
164 By this, he did not intend to "deprecate the need of a high standard of ethics in the practice of tax law [,] " 165 but instead considered it debatable whether the high standard of ethics applicable to tax lawyers was meaningfully distinguishable from the high standard applicable to all lawyers. 166 Mr. Paul also seemed to doubt the usefulness of settling these types of questions in the abstract, preferring instead to discuss the ethical demands in concrete cases. 167 After considering several such cases, he concluded that he had no definitive answer but doubted whether a tax attorney had any special responsibility. 168 While he countenanced the possibility that there are special rules that may apply to tax lawyers prior to a case entering litigation, he found it "clear enough that they cease to apply when a civil tax case reaches the litigation stage . . . ."
169 He concluded his analysis with one point on which he was certain: a tax lawyer ought to use his special expertise and experience to improve the tax law-and that he ought to do so regardless of potential client objections to the position he takes. 170 New York City tax lawyer and treatise author Mark H. Johnson argued against any special tax lawyer duty to the system by focusing on the effects of suggesting to clients that their tax lawyers have dual responsibilities. Mr. Johnson's argument begins with distinguishing between "the people collectively as a citizenry" and "individual citizens as separate taxpayers." 171 A collective citizenry may trust its government and understand the need for its government to be funded. 172 However, an individual taxpaying citizen also knows that in a tax case he will either prevail and pay less or the government will 161 E.g., id. at 241, 269. 162 Paul, supra note 5 at 425. 163 See Maguire, supra note 26. 164 Paul, supra note 5 at 425. Mr. Paul is the one who mentions his own conversion on this point. Id. at 425, n. 58. He cites his "Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser." Paul, supra note 59. Both his Rocky Mountain Law Review and Harvard Law Review articles are tremendously insightful and nicely written, though the latter Rocky Mountain Law Review article presumably is more reflective of his later thought. In the earlier Harvard Law Review article, he explicitly championed the idea that the tax lawyer must not treat the sovereign government as a mere adversary, as well as going to lengths in other ways to emphasize the uniqueness of tax practice vis-à-vis other legal fields. See id. 165 Paul, supra note 5 at 425. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id. at 430. 169 Id. 170 Id. at 434. 171 Johnson, supra note 88 at 28. 172 Id.
prevail and he will pay more. 173 Thus, the individual taxpayer does have an interest adverse to the government's interest, even if the collective citizenry does not. 174 Mr. Johnson emphasized that the individual taxpayer wants advice from a lawyer who is "worried about him . . . ." 175 Mr. Johnson argued that it is very important that each individual taxpayer is satisfied that his personal tax lawyer has an undivided duty to him, subsequently giving him the benefit of "all doubts and all choices." 176 Only if this duty is satisfied will the individual taxpayer rely on his tax lawyer. 177 If he believes his tax lawyer is not worried exclusively about him, he will resort to self-help.
178
The long-term consequence of tax clients being told their lawyers are not worried exclusively about them would be "wholesale tax evasion . . . by a skeptical and unadvised citizenry." 179 Whereas others argued that the voluntary compliance system justifies special duties on tax lawyers, Mr. Johnson argued that imposing special duties on tax lawyers would undermine the voluntary compliance system:
[S]ince the absolute condition to a taxpayer's compliance is his confidence in his expert's advice, the whole community has a stake in instilling the confidence . . . we must assure the taxpayer that the advice he gets is being directed to his own best interest. He must feel sure that he is not getting the advice of a conscientious revenue agent, nor even the advice of a conscientious Tax Court judge. He must know he is getting the advice of his own counselor and advocate. He must know, in other words, that his advisor is in his own corner, and is not in the middle of the ring as referee. Only then can the taxpayer be expected to be trustful enough to throw away his tip sheets and stifle his own protective instincts. 180 Mr. Johnson had another argument against imposing special obligations on tax lawyers. He attributed the "remarkably coherent, uniform, and equitable body of law" enjoyed by Americans to the adversarial process with tax lawyers on one side and government lawyers on the other. 181 Tax lawyers provided a tremendous and necessary benefit to the system not because of any special duty incumbent upon them, but instead by merely acting as lawyers. 182 In addition to serving this essential role, Mr. Johnson encouraged tax lawyers to engage in "disinterested public service," such as work in bar associations where, he insisted, the lawyers were not to bring their client's cases to bear. Like Professor Bittker, Mr. Johnson believed that the ethics rules applicable to all lawyers were sufficient for tax lawyers. 184 He argued that the recognition of boundaries on a tax lawyer's behavior was not recognition of a special responsibility to the government. 185 Rather, lawyering within boundariessuch as avoiding fraudulent representations-was simply "a matter of my dignity and pride as a lawyer." 186 Mr. Johnson emphasized this point stating: "I would hate to think this is considered some special obligations of the tax lawyer."
187
Professor John Potts Barnes denied that it was the tax lawyer's role to be "the keeper of the taxpayer's conscience or an instrument for the voluntary assessment system . . . ."
188 Much like Professor Bittker and Mr. Johnson, he believed that the general ethical obligations of all lawyers to "act honestly and fairly" and "be law-abiding" and "to advise compliance with the law" was sufficient to guide tax lawyers, as well.
189
Professor Barnes did not hesitate to characterize the client and the Treasury Department's relationship as adversarial, writing that this does not reflect any particular view of the government, but simply reflects that the individual taxpayer, regardless of political orientation, "carries on a running battle" to minimize his income tax liabilities.
190
Similar to the arguments made by Mr. Johnson, Professor Barnes insisted that a lawyer advising his client on how to lawfully minimize taxes was not "thwarting or defeating the system" but, on the contrary, was "assisting in its proper working, because the taxpayer is as much entitled to the benefits of the law as he is obligated by its burdens."
191
Professor John Potts Barnes believed that the tax lawyer's ethics did have special significance in the voluntary assessment system. 192 However, it did not involve the tax lawyer taking on a special role of any sort. Much like Mr. Johnson, Professor Barnes argued that the tax lawyer, simply by lawyering, "contributes to the effective operation" of the tax system. 193 However, this is neither because the tax lawyer is motivated by some special duty to the system nor because he sets out with the intention of improving the system. Rather, it is because he is merely "motivated by the impulse to give the advice that is for the best interest of the client" and within the general limits of legal ethics. 194 Any duty that would limit the effectiveness of the tax lawyer's devotion to the client is one that, perhaps paradoxically, would undermine the benefits to the system provided by the tax lawyer.
Much like Mr. Darrell, Washington D.C. tax attorney Seymour S. Mintz (Hogan & Hartson) was unable to define a strictly adversarial relationship between tax clients and the government prior to the two entering the courtroom. 195 With respect to tax advice, he pondered the question of whether or not tax lawyers had "some greater degree of responsibility to be objective" than lawyers giving advice in other 184 Id. at 32. 185 198 First, he said there was a "sizeable segment" of the tax bar which believes the ethical considerations applicable to tax lawyers are merely those applicable in other fields.
199
Circular 230, according to this view, is nothing but a detailed "implementation or an elaboration" of how those considerations are to be applied in the tax field. 200 Second, he said there was a "larger group" who believed that there was "something special and peculiar about practicing in the tax field . . . ."
201 This position could be justified by any one or a number of considerations: the self-assessment system cannot work in a purely adversary context; the sovereign is simply not the same as a "purely civil adversary;" the taxpayer has control of all the facts; or tax lawyers are members of the Treasury Bar and, at the minimum, that membership "demands a higher duty of disclosure . . . ." 202 Finally, he said there was a "midway" position unconcerned with theoretical resolutions and grounded pragmatically:
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine whether the practitioner does have dual responsibilities [to his client and to his government], but that it is just good business for you, for the client and for the government to try to minimize adversary aspects just as much as possible, and to increase the disclosure aspects just as much as possible, and thereby to improve relationships among the three of you as much as possible.
203
For Mr. Mintz, practicing tax law at the borderline was "just not good tax practice or good tax business . . . ."
204 With this fact of practice in mind, he concluded it was a "mere academic exercise when we discuss the degree to which there is this dual relationship . . . ." 205 In his mind, "it is in our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility," regardless of the academic conclusion.
206
Others shared Mr. Mintz's conviction that the difference between good tax ethics and a good tax practice may be merely academic, at least in many circumstances. IRS Chief Counsel Crane C. Hauser argued the tax lawyer's professional reputation within the IRS offices was not "simply a matter of ethics" but "a matter of dollars and cents to the practitioner."
207 Indeed, Mr. Hauser suggested that rather than speaking of dual responsibilities to client and government, it would be useful to invoke a third responsibility: the lawyer as to himself, that is, to preserve his professional reputation.
208 Mortimer Caplin and Mr. Holland agreed that "we will find ourselves pretty good tax advisers" by avoiding advice that raises ethical concerns within us.
209
New York City tax lawyer Milton Young (Young, Kaplan & Edelstein) followed this sentiment as well, writing that a moral reaction is "often a correct forecast of the effectiveness of the plan itself." 210 For Mr. Young, it was reasonable to speak of a dual duty to the client and government, but he emphasized that a "dual responsibility" is not necessarily a conflicting one. 211 It is good for both the government and the client to avoid bad tax planning, he thought.
E. DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
Alongside the debate on the general duty to the system was the more specific debate on whether or not there was a duty to disclose "doubtful but arguable points in a tax return." 212 Norris Darrell argued there was. 213 For Mr. Darrell, the relevant issue was not his own professional judgment on the taxability of the issue but rather his professional judgment as to whether "the government would probably seek to tax it."
214 Although he argued for a general rule to disclose any item that "might be considered taxable by tax authorities," he also argued for an exception. 215 The exception would be those situations in which "there are many courts decisions uniformly in his client's favor but as to which the government bullheadedly hadn't get given up."
216
And into the calculations of the government's probable interestand whether or not the interest was merely bullheaded -Mr. Darrell also cited the need to consider potential penalties (e.g., for disregarding regulations) and potential tactical decisions (e.g., making and reporting gifts in a year in which the need to file a gift return was debatable -so as to start the statute of limitations).
217
Despite his unambiguous argument for a duty to disclose, it was, ultimately, merely a presumptive duty. He recognized the "difficulty of generalizing," and wrote that the decision "depends upon your best judgment as to the law, the merits of any claim of taxability and the government's probable attitude." 218 Mr. Darrell asserted a presumptive general duty to disclose, and shared his thoughts on what factors might overcome the presumption, but he did not argue for it from specific theoretical premises. Professor Jerome Hellerstein, in contrast, deduced a disclosure duty from his theoretical conviction that the taxpayer and the government were not in an adversarial relationship in the way a plaintiff and defendant would be. 219 Professor Hellerstein thought that the prevailing norm of the tax bar was "perfectly clear" that the there was no duty to "recommend full and fair disclosure" in situations in which the lawyer is "reasonably clear" that the Bureau would decide the issue adversely, but "not as clear as to the results in the courts." 220 And he believed this would be appropriate were the taxpayer and the 209 Id. at 38. Mortimer Caplin believed that tax lawyers should "accept their special responsibilities," and that they should be "willing to work cooperatively for stronger and better tax administration not only for their own interest, but in the interest of the nation, as well." Caplin, supra note 21 at 21. 210 Young, supra note 88 at 40. 211 Id. at 39. 212 Norris Darrell in Bittker, supra note 31 at 92. 213 Id. 214 Id. 215 Id. 216 Id. 217 Darrell, supra note 84 at 10-11. 218 Id. 219 Cahn et al., supra note 2 at 9. 220 Id. at 8. government in a typical adversarial relationship. 221 Denying that to be the relationship, and desiring that tax lawyers would work to improve "tax morality," he urged tax lawyers to bring their influence "to bear in order to develop in the community generally ethical standards which require full and fair disclosure by the taxpayer."
222 Professor Hellerstein did not elaborate on what "full and fair disclosure" meant, nor when it should be provided or what counter-considerations there might be. He lamented the current ethical comfort with the lack of disclosure, urging a higher standard, but not considering the practicalities, at least not in the way Mr. Darrell did. 223 Randolph Paul did not analyze the duty to disclose in light of an abstract relationship between the taxpayer and the government, nor did he lament the current practice. Instead, he described the current practice as more nuanced than Professor Hellerstein took it to be. In situations where the legal issues are in a "thicket of obscurity" or lack a "yardstick for measurement," such as the ones Professor Hellerstein considered specifically, Mr. Paul was at ease with the prevailing norm not to disclose. 224 Nor did he think disclosure should be warranted when an issue has been "repeatedly decided favorably to taxpayers" but the Bureau continues a "policy of persistent litigation." 225 However, he believed that most tax lawyers would insist the client disclose in order to make substantially debatable issues "automatically come to the attention of the revenue agent. 226 In general, Mr. Paul characterized the disclosure territory as one in which "many borderline problems constantly arise." 227 While he did not stake-out a theoretical position, given his focus on the merits of the underlying issue, and whether or not the Bureau was unreasonably litigating an issue, in practical terms it seems quite likely that Mr. Paul's and Mr. Darrell's positions would reach similar results.
Professor Boris Bittker provided the most thorough analysis of the issue. Though Professor Bittker thought the issue would be better discussed at the taxpayer-level (as did Professor Barnes) 228 , he left the discussion at the professional-level as this was where it usually occurred. Professor Bittker focused on whether or not there was a "professional obligation" to disclose debatable items, contrasting this from more practical considerations, such as disclosing to avoid the possibility of a penalty or an extended statute of limitations or disclosing for "a tactical advantage vis-à-vis other debatable items on the return." 229 221 Id at 9. 222 Id. 223 Due to his rhetorical style, Professor Hellerstein's thoughts on the subject are arguably ambiguous. He describes the prevailing norm with specificity but his own assessment of it is rather general. Professor John Maguire concluded that Professor Hellerstein did not argue for a higher duty of disclosure, Maguire, supra note 26 at 42, fn. 60, but Randolph Paul concluded that he did, Paul, supra note 5 at 427. While Professor Hellerstein's rhetoric obscures his reasoning in some places, I believe Mr. Paul provided the more sensitive reading, characterizing Professor Hellerstein as having "regretfully concluded" that the prevailing norm was against disclosure whereas Professor Maguire restated Professor Hellerstein's description of the prevailing norm without catching the fairly clear sense of his regret as to it. Id. 224 Id. 225 Id 226 Id. at 428. 227 Id. 228 Barnes, supra note 27 at 1038. 229 Bittker, supra note 31 at 251.
Professor Bittker identified two arguments for a general professional obligation of disclosure. First, the practitioner may be wrong about the taxability of the item, and disclosure permits the orderly resolution of it. 230 Second, a taxpayer ought not to benefit from the mere volume of returns, which, without disclosure, might often mean the taxpayer receives a tax benefit to which he is not truly entitled. 231 In contrast, Professor Bittker argued, first, while disclosure is already required in certain specific situations (e.g., receipt of stock in allegedly tax-free reorganizations), neither the Regulations nor the Service imposes a general obligation of disclosure. 232 Second, if there were a general obligation, the burden on the Service would be increased tremendously as there would be "hundreds or thousands of riders" filed annually. 233 Third, if there a general obligation of disclosure, it should extend to matters not usually reflected on returns (e.g., exclusions) and should not be limited to matters that are (e.g., deductions). 234 Fourth, there are often complex issues underlying the relevant tax issue (e.g., allocation of costs of goods sold), and if there were an obligation of disclosure related to the relevant tax issue, it would need to extend to the underlying issues. 235 Professor Bittker argued that the fundamental issue was as to the purpose of the tax return. On the one hand, the purpose of the return might be considered to present the taxpayer's opinion as to his tax liability -his and his tax advisor's honest beliefs about the liability. 236 On the other hand, the purpose of the return might be considered to present to the government all "it ought to know to make the most efficient use of its auditing facilities."
237 If one has the "honest-belief approach to the tax return," then honestly presenting one's opinion as to the liability is required but flagging an issue on which the Service is expected to disagree is not. However, if one has the "audit-assistance concept," then flagging the issue for the Service should be required.
Professor Bittker held the honest-belief approach. He thought to require taxpayers to engage in audit-assistance would be counter-productive. "A vague concept of taxpayer disclosure for debatable items" would be not be an efficient assistance to the Service, and it would be impose significant "moral wear and tear" on the taxpayers (e.g., it would encourage "hypocritical" claims that certain issues were not really debatable). 238 If the Service determines to seek more specific information in certain situations, then it should do what it has already done which is to specify what information it wants in which situations.
239 Specificity -backed with potential penalties -would be an efficient and clear approach, while an overarching duty to disclose whatever the practitioner thought the Service might want to review would not. 230 Id. at 252. 231 Id. at 252. 232 Id. at 252-253. 233 Id. at 253. 234 Id. at 253-254. 235 Id. at 253-254. 236 Id. at 254. 237 Id. 238 Id. at 255. 239 Id.
Professor Boris Bittker admitted the "full-disclosure" approach carried a loftier "vision of taxpayer cooperation with the government in a common search of truth" than did his own approach. 240 But Professor Bittker (who suspected the full-disclosure approach reflected the influence of securities disclosure law on legal practice) 241 was not alone in rejecting it. He was joined by Professor John M. Maguire, who suspected considerable hypocrisy on the disclosure issue, writing "there are more words of conscientious subservience to the idea of open returns openly arrived at than unpublicized practice justifies in fact." 242 Gerald Wallace believed that so long as the "attorney is of the position that the Bureau's position is wrong," there is no duty to disclose simply "for the purpose inviting close examination."
243 Mark H. Johnson believed that having "a reasonable basis for an advantageous position" is what counts, and there is no reason to "provoke controversy by advertising the grounds on which it might be attacked." Mark H. Johnson emphasized education as the foundation to being a good tax lawyer. He believed that given the variety of non-tax legal issues with which tax lawyers must be familiar, a tax lawyer "probably must place more reliance than most lawyers upon the adequacy of his law school education." 247 The importance of a broad legal education for the tax lawyer was not, however, Mr. Johnson's exclusive focus. He indicated the importance of studying "the great literature of the world." 248 Without a tax lawyer having done so, even "the surface of his speech and writing will reflect the narrowness of his learning and make his judgment suspect." 249 Mr. Johnson also argued that a tax lawyer must be knowledgeable in world history, as he believed that such knowledge gave "perspective for the immediate eddies and currents of the law" and "data for long-term appraisal and predictions." 250 Mr. 240 Id. at 255. 241 Id. at 271. Professor Bittker was not the only writer connecting issues of tax return disclosure with those of securities disclosures. Mortimer Caplin also connected the two, simply by questioning if tax disclosure standards should be the same as what "the SEC requires in a prospectus." Caplin, supra note 21 at 19. 242 Maguire, supra note 26 at 42. 243 Cahn et al., supra note 2 at 31. 244 Young, supra note 88 at 32. 245 Caplin, supra note 21 at 17; Caplin, supra note 55 at 1033. 246 Id. 247 Cahn et al., supra note 28 at 4. 248 Id. at 5. 249 Id. 250 Id.
Johnson believed that the cultural taste for this type of learning is "pretty well developed by the time a young man arrives at law school" and so only if he arrives at law school with such a "desirable background and habits" does he have much of a chance of not "retrogressing." 251 In addition to knowing the humanities, Mr. Johnson also argued that a good tax lawyer must know calculus (for understanding life expectancy curves); economics and statistics (for understanding supply and demand curves, and especially useful for dealing with the excess profits tax); government; public finance; and accounting (for the tax lawyer, a "balance sheet or income statement must be read as easily a baseball score card.").
252
The tax lawyer, Mr. Johnson argued, must understand that he is "a lawyer who knows something about taxes" and never a "'tax expert' who happens to be a lawyer." 253 He must "know as much law as any other lawyer," beginning with "contracts, sales, property, equity, wills, corporations, partnerships, agency, and negotiable instruments," and, in addition, he must know "the principles of administrative law . . . Tax Court practice, and the Federal Rules . . . [and] all the law of evidence." 254 Most of all, he must know the Internal Revenue Code "at least as well as a minister knows his Bible," and keep an "orderly mental catalogue" of regulations, rulings, and cases (specifically including obsolete authorities as "the obsolete is . . . key to the current."). 255 In order to succeed, a tax lawyer must be reconciled to the fact that he always needs to do "more research on specific problems than is required of his brethren in general practice," and that the "economic justification is that he will spend less additional time for his client on those phases of his work than the general practitioner will spend in finding the tax law." 256 Finally, Mr. Johnson underscored the importance of the tax knowledge one gains only by "experience." 257 The tax lawyer learns "the workings of the Bureau" by experience. 258 The tax lawyer develops a reliable predictive intuition as to "a tax official's reaction" by experience. 259 The tax lawyer acquires a reliable clairvoyance in his "guesswork as to long term 'trends'" by experience." 260 And it is only by experience the tax lawyer learns to recognize "patterns in tax problems and solutions." 261 Professor Harry J. Rudick addressed the symposium on the skills necessary for being a successful tax lawyer. He thought these skills were "pretty much the same as the skills required for success in the practice of other fields . . . ."
262 Some of these skills, he argued, could "only be acquired by experience," however, he added that others "are inherent" and "[t]he latter may be nurtured and developed but unlike cultured pearls, their seeds cannot be implanted." 263 that "the great majority of the tax practitioners who have achieved success" have, "in significant measure," the skills identified.
264
Professor Rudick's list of skills was varied. He considered a "good memory" as among the most indispensible skills for a successful tax lawyer. 265 For example, "when a client telephones and wants the answer to an answerable question," since "[i]n the vast majority of cases the question is one which the practitioner has looked up before," the quality of the practitioner's memory can save the client "time and expense." 266 Of course, not every tax question is readily answerable, but if it is, memory likely will be the resource that provides the answer. Along with a good memory, a successful tax lawyer needs to be able to write well and speak well, being careful to avoid "verbosity and pomposity." 267 The successful tax lawyer also needs the ability to administer the law office: "to select and train assistants, delegate work to them, and appraise that work."
268
The tax lawyer who tries to do it all himself eventually suffers professionally, and his "usefulness to business world and the bar are circumscribed." 269 Finally, the successful tax lawyer must also have good judgment and be decisive. 270 Good judgment, being "a compound of experience, knowledge, and talent," is
[T]he ability to look at a case 'in the round' and not merely from a single viewpoint; to approach a problem objectively and without bias; to evaluate the importance of the separate issues of a case in relation to the entire case; to weigh the chances of success in litigation; and to foresee the probable consequences of success or failure in relation to the whole enterprise . . . . Judgment includes knowing when to listen, when to argue, and when to stop listening and arguing. It includes an ability to change one's mind . . . .
271
When it comes time to make a judgment, the tax lawyer must do so decisively rather than in an "equivocal or wishy-washy" way. 272 It is the "problems which do not permit . . . categorical solution" that are most likely to be submitted to the successful tax lawyer, and even where the "suggested answer is no more than an informed guess, the practitioner is not excused from stating his position-with an appropriate caveat, of course." 273 264 Id. at 8. 265 Id. at 6. 266 Id. 267 Id. at 7. As an aside, Professor Rudick notes that "the lower schools" ought to work harder to remedy writing defects in their students, as his law students were making "[m]istakes in grammar and spelling" and sentence structure in their "examination papers." Id. Given the regularity with which this complaint is heard among law professors today, there is some odd comfort in his expression of concern, even though I fear he would indict my own lower schools. 268 Id. at 8. 269 Id.. 270 Id. at 7-8. 271 Id. at 8. 272 Id. at 7. 273 Id. at 7.
Robert N. Miller addressed the symposium on "the successful tax lawyer's character and personal relationships." 274 He thought a tax lawyer must have a "youthful and daring spirit" because "a peculiar quality of tax controversies is that each one is likely to present at least some unique features" and so the tax lawyer "will often be called on to enter territory which is relatively unexplored . . . ."
275 This "daring spirit" is different from the spirit of a lawyer who "never knows when he is licked." 276 The successful tax lawyer must "recognize the real weaknesses of a situation" and, more importantly, must be able "to induce the client to recognize them-even the client who would rather not." 277 A good tax lawyer must have "in a special degree the quality of patience," especially when "dealing with Government conferees," and must be able to foresee "each possible difficulty . . . the Bureau men" may discover. 278 Additionally, a successful tax lawyer must be able "to use effectively in his work a number of partners and assistants, as well as experts in the field of accounting, engineering, and economics." 279 Perhaps the most interesting highlight of Mr. Miller's very practical advice is that he subjects it all to the following preface:
[A] truly successful lawyer's career must be consistent with the lawyer's own achievement of a well-balanced life as an individual and as a member of the bar . . . . A professional man who gets the details of his own life into a tangle is not likely to exhibit broad intelligence in guiding the affairs of other people; the tax field, particularly, calls for exercise of general wisdom, because there are very large areas in which the adviser can get no decisive help from established precedents. 280 According to Mr. Miller, a good tax lawyer must have a well-ordered life in order to advise well anotherthat is, if a lawyer's wisdom is not sufficient to govern his own life, how could it be useful to his clients? As Mr. Miller put it, the successful practice of tax law may rely more on practical wisdom than technical analysis.
281
Although not part of the 1951 symposium, Norris Darrell took time to provide very specific advice on tax advising. Mr. Darrell described a typical tax client as someone who wants "to keep his taxes down . . . taking advantage of every possible loophole in the law" but who "seldom comprehends the difference between sound and border-line transactions." 282 The tax lawyer has to make a judgment as to the "elusive lines between what may be done and what dare not be done with reasonable tax safety." 283 He described the common situation in which a tax lawyer finds himself:
We have oftentimes found ourselves in the uncomfortable position of having to cast a wet blanket over tax minimization schemes developed by overly enthusiastic planners, with 274 Id. at 1. 275 Id. at 9. 276 Id. at 10. 277 Id. 278 Id. at 10-11. 279 Id. at 10. 280 Id. at 9. 281 Id. at 12. 282 Darrell, supra note 23 at 983. 283 Id.
the attendant risk that we may appear in the eyes of our clients, who too often confuse cleverness for competence, to be more negative than constructive minded. 284 Mr. Darrell wrote that "cleverness is not competence" and "the too-clever, overly-enthusiastic tax planner is likely to be either a limited or an irresponsible man." 285 But it is "inexcusable to frustrate appropriate and desirable action because of a lurking fear, born of confusion; only the incompetent will do that."
286 While the good tax lawyer "must only too often disappoint clients and only too often turn down the fashionable tax device of the moment," he need not always "take a line so conservative that his clients drop off to more daring advisers."
287 Being either unduly clever or unduly fearful is incompetent and irresponsible. 288 Mr. Darrell sketches out the steps for competent tax advice-infused not only with "care and caution," but also "constructive imagination and ingenuity . . . ."
289
To give good tax advice, a tax lawyer must first "make that 'most inordinate expenditure of time'" in understanding the statute, regulations, and rulings. 290 The "second tool" the lawyer should acquire is "a thorough knowledge of [the] so-called tax common law . . . ."
291 Third, the tax lawyer "should be thoroughly acquainted with administrative procedure."
292 Fourth, the tax lawyer must "know how to investigate the ultimate reality" of the relevant facts, including the "client's real desires and best interests," bearing in mind that a client is sometimes "influenced too greatly by saving taxes" and influenced too little by "what he would really want to do" if he "considered the matter more carefully in the light of his own best interests and those of his family." 293 The lawyer must also remember the difference between "facts as related orally by the client and facts which can be proved to a Court."
294 He must be ready to dig up the facts like "a miner who digs up mounts of earth to reach the ore." 295 Mr. Darrell emphasized that being a good tax lawyer "requires training, experience and real work" in order to "marshal and analyze facts effectively, and to be able to identify a transaction by its right name . . . ."
296
Having taken these steps, the tax lawyer has not finished his job but has just begun the most important part of it. He must realize that the steps "function only to make judgments informed, and cannot . . . take the place of judgment." 297 He must recognize that the "the line is not a static but a 284 Id. Other ethics writers identified the common need to throw a wet blanket on tax advice with the risk of appearing too negative-minded. Often times, the alleged advice comes not from another lawyer or an accountant but the neighbor "Joe", whose lawyers "dreamed up a wonderful scheme whereby he could save thousands of dollars in taxes without risking anything." Holland et al., supra note 87 at 35-36. Of course, Joe, having advised his neighbor of the wonders of his tax lawyers, prompts the neighbor to ask his own lawyer, "Why don't you consider setting up a scheme like that for me?" Id. 285 Bittker, supra note 31 at 100. 286 shifting one." 298 He must ponder the relevant history and likely changes, being careful to interpret "the overriding Congressional purpose" involved. 299 He must realize that a good tax plan should be "adapted to survive amid the interplay of living social forces" and never "simply jig-saw cut . . . ." 300 It is with these issues that Mr. Darrell believed "that considerations of moral and ethical propriety and legal effectiveness . . . often shade into each other" insofar as a "foul-smelling" plan is "likely to be adjudged ineffective" eventually. 301 In this realm of professional judgment, Mr. Darrell compares the tax lawyer with "the perfume smeller or the wine taster." 302 Finally, in arriving at his final judgment, the good tax lawyer never loses "sight of the fact that the tax consideration is only one of the many factors that should be taken into account," and that "illconsidered action to escape taxes may prove . . . tragic . . . ." 303 He must then have "a character, and a breadth of background, training and experience in business and personal affairs" that will enable him "to put all aspects of the matter before his client in their proper light so that the client may be guided toward a wise decision." 304 Much as Mr. Darrell characterized clients as apt to confuse technical cleverness for practical judgment, Merle H. Miller believed they were likely to have "more faith in technicalities" than their lawyers do. 305 They think tax lawyers must have "a bag of tricks that greatly reduces our clients' taxes and probably get us out altogether on our own."
306 Or so they may think, "until they call on upon us in a professional way and usually leave in amazement after being told that they really owe more than they thought they did when they came to see us."
307
Rather than finding tax lawyers to be technical magicians with secrets for sale, Mr. Miller thought the client was more likely to find a professional who considers his primary job to be preventing his clients "from going off on screwy tantrums, diverting their energies into non-productive tax avoidance activities, to the great detriment of our productive system and our tax collecting system." 308 Whereas Mr. Darrell wrote that tax lawyers often have to throw a "wet blanket" on such tantrums, 309 Mr. Miller provided a more graphic description, writing that a tax lawyer spends nine-tenths of his time killing schemes believed by the proponents to be new, but which were actually dead and buried many Revenue Acts and many decisions ago. As we grow old in the practice, this mortality rate bothers us less and less, and we come to suspect that the scheme is bad even before we have heard it. Once a man has become reconciled 298 Id. at 989. 299 Id. at 986. 300 Id. at 988. 301 Bittker, supra note 31 at 101. 302 Id. The tax lawyer's use of the "smell test" was mentioned in Holland et al., supra note 87 at 23, 38, 43. The image of the nose as a useful guide to the tax lawyer appears to have been in circulation among tax lawyers for quite some time. 303 Darrell, supra note 23 at 988. 304 Id. 305 M. Miller, supra note 22 at 1075. 306 Id. at 1074. 307 Id. at 1074-75. 308 Id. at 1076. 309 See discussion supra p. 27 and note 284.
to the proposition that there is little new under the sun, this job of decimating someone else's brain child becomes rather perfunctory, and even loses some of its zest. 310 Mr. Miller concluded by writing, "[t]he man who can kill off a bad tax scheme at its inception is contributing greatly to the well being of the country at large." 311 Unfortunately, as he put it, "[i]nfanticide is as abhorrent in the intellectual, as in the physical realm," and so while "[i]t is easy to kill off someone else's scheme," it is "most difficult to maintain that critical attitude with respect to one's own creations."
312 And thus, the challenge for a good tax lawyer is to maintain that critical attitude with respect to his own advice. 313 Mr. Miller pointed out that we must guard ourselves against becoming too "enmeshed in the same wishes which motivate our clients" for when this happens we are "rendered easier to please with our own answers" and "are most apt to fit together the letter of the statute and the court decisions" in coming up with "an answer that will satisfy everyone"-except the "moral sense of the revenue agent and the court that will test it."
314 Those lawyers, he continued, who may have "been able to invoke righteous indignation" when killing off some other advisor's "flagrant tax scheme" may often "fall victim to a lack of moral sensibilities in testing their own brain creations."
315 Thus, Mr. Miller urged that tax lawyers "should be as zealous in developing a sense of moral fairness as in acquiring a technical working knowledge of the Code." 316 The good tax lawyer needs both technical knowledge and the sense of moral fairness which is necessary for testing his own tax advice.
Mr. Miller put great emphasis on this moral sense. 317 He argued that applying this moral sense to interpreting the tax code was what courts did when settling cases. 318 Citing cases like Gregory, Clifford, and Court Holding Co. as evidence, Mr. Miller wrote "[w]e have witnessed during the past twenty years the growth of court-made law which is to our tax law what equity was to the old common law." 319 The moral sense of the tax lawyer was similar to this equitable sense of the courts, and it was an essential qualification of the good tax lawyer because it had become an essential aspect of evolving tax law. As part of this evolution, statutory formalities were often "completely or partially disregarded" by the courts "to the extent necessary to achieve a 'right' result." 320 And what was the source of the sense of a right result? It was nothing other than "the moral sensibilities of the courts today." 321 This sense of "morality in our courts is the only known factor accountable" for the decisions cited, he argued. 322 Mr. Miller wrote " [t] here is a sense of morality rampant in our courts today, ready to take care of any omission of Congress, or any brilliant scheme of the most brilliant genius" if such an omission or scheme would "result in an unfair dislocation" of tax burden. 323 The practical tax lawyer considers the long term when eyeing "a loophole which long research fails to discount . . . ." 324 The practical tax lawyer "will not hesitate to condemn a plan merely on the ground that it offends his own moral sensibilities" because such a plan is "apt to be found deficient by a court that would have less desire to find the plan effective than would the tax counselor."
325 Lawyers assuming their "own moral sensibilities were irrelevant as guides" in interpreting the tax law was the reason that "[m]any clients are in trouble today."
326 " [N] ow that morality is part of our tax laws," a taxpayer cannot "afford to have a tax advisor whose sense of morality is less acute than that of the courts." 327 Randolph E. Paul emphasized the importance of tax lawyers beginning with a coherent "philosophy on the subject of tax avoidance." 328 Mr. Paul urged tax lawyers to accept that because "different tax consequences may flow from the different methods of accomplishing the same economic result," it follows that taxpayers "are plainly entitled to select the method which results in the lower tax liability." 329 He believed that there was no reason to "hesitate to advise the client fully and frankly in choosing among 'the oddities in tax consequences' that emerge from the different methods of accomplishing the same economic result." 330 The tax lawyer's personal, ethical, or policy concerns are not relevant to this task; his task is simply "to help the client reduce his tax liability to the lowest possible legal level or save him from a greater tax liability than his transactions need to carry." 332 He thought it important that a tax lawyer not have too much "vested intellectual interest" in other areas of the law," as it might make him "overanxious to apply in tax territory principles which will not be welcome there."
333
Income taxation is distinctive in considerable part due to its being a young field of law, starting only "a little more than a quarter of a century ago."
334
In comparison with other fields of law, Mr. Paul considered tax law to be less concerned with "form and technicality," and more oriented towards a "search for underlying substance and basic realities."
335
In one article, Mr. Paul emphasized the differences between tax lawyers and other lawyers, but then, having undergone a philosophical conversion on the specialness of tax lawyering, he later emphasized the similarities, at least for certain ethics purposes. 336 But even that change in his own thinking, his practical caution of too much interest in non-tax fields was presumably un-connected with his more abstract shift in ethical philosophy. 324 Id. at 1074. 325 Id. 326 Id. at 1076. 327 Id. at 1076-77. 328 Paul, supra note 5 at 414. 329 Id. at 416. 330 Id. at 418-19. 331 Id. 332 See Paul, supra note 59 at 380. 333 Id. 334 Id. at 381. 335 Id. 336 Id. In this article, Mr. Paul also distinguished tax law from other fields by citing that its controversies were between the taxpayers and their government rather than a private adversary. In this article, he asserted this "puts the public interest into the equation and enormously complicates the responsibilities of the tax adviser. In his later article in the Rocky Mountain Law Review, he instead argued that the tax field was not as distinctive from other Randolph E. Paul he wrote that when the tax client comes in, that client "may have a specific plan in mind or he may have a general objective," and he has come to check with the tax lawyer "whether a given course of conduct will produce unforeseen tax liability or whether a foreseen liability may be minimized." 337 Unlike Mr. Darrell or Mr. Miller, Mr. Paul's criticism of clients was not that they had too much faith in technicalities but rather their "ingenuity and uncanny cunning at concealing and suppressing facts," which, he continued, "pass my poor powers of description."
338 In order to get at the facts, he suggested that the lawyer prepare for the "client in writing exactly what he has told the lawyer orally." 339 This technique works because the client "will hardly be able to resist the temptation to demonstrate the mistakes his lawyer has made," which "may be humiliating to the lawyer" but, he added, "a little mortification is a small price for the discovery of the essential facts." 340 He also criticized clients who "come to a lawyer to cover their own tracks."
341 These clients, he writes, "want to follow a given course of action" and want "the lawyer to share blame if results are disappointing."
342 He cautioned lawyers in these situations, especially if they are tempted "to give an immediate opinion." 343 Mr. Paul continued with a reminder that even though competition for the client pressures the tax lawyer to give in and "slant opinions in the direction of a client's desires," 344 a lawyer should always recall that "[i]n tax law the day of reckoning is often on earth and not in heaven."
345 Or, as he otherwise puts this sobering thought: "the tax adviser's failure will be measurable in dollars and cents, the client's dollars and cents-and the tax adviser's, as well." 347 He argued it is important that the tax lawyer consider "interstitial judicial legislation," as well as understanding that "the policy of tax statutes is not always to be found in the literal meaning" used in the statutes, because the statutes "derive vitality from the obvious purpose as which they are aimed." 348 The tax lawyer, he elaborated, must consider not only what the law is, but also what it "will become" when giving advice.
349 Continuing, Mr. Paul indicated that the tax lawyer must know the statute, the regulations, the rulings, the courts decisions, and the "suggestion and criticism and dogma" of the "[m]agazines, law reviews, [and] lawyer must also have the "gift of controlled intuition," the ability to think "with his profound intestines" when giving his systematized predictions.
351
In writing what may well be the best single paragraph on tax advising, Mr. Paul warned:
Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable skeptic; he must discount everything he hears and reads. The market place abounds with unsound avoidance schemes which will not stand the test of objective analysis and litigation. The escaped tax, a favorite topic of conversation at the best clubs and the most sumptuous pleasure resorts, expands with repetition into fantastic legends. But clients want opinions with happy endings, and he smiles best who smiles last. It is wiser to state misgivings at the beginning than to have to acknowledge them ungracefully at the end. The tax adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his time advising against schemes of this character. I sometimes think the most important word in his vocabulary is "No;" certainly he must frequently use this word most emphatically when it will be an unwelcome answer to a valuable client, and even when he knows that the client may shop for a more welcome answer in other offices which are more interested in pleasing clients than they are in rendering sound opinions.
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G. REFORM AGENDA
In the articles and essays devoted to professional ethics, some of the tax lawyers also expressed opinions on certain tax reform needs. Professor Bittker, for example, encouraged the Treasury Department to license or to enroll all return preparers in order to reduce the abuses of the system, such as a preparer's wholesale manufacturing of tax deductions and credits. 353 Both Mortimer Caplin and he mentioned the possibility of moving to a British-styled system in which returns certified by accountants or lawyers would be subject to less scrutiny.
354
New York City tax lawyer and treatise-author Jacob Rabkin complained about the complexity of the tax law, writing "[n]o society developed on so fine-spun a statute or set of laws can help from failing from its sheer weight." 355 Mr. Merle H. Miller thought the solution to the problem of complexity in the code was to accept imperfections in the code. He warned against ever pursuing the improvement of the code, "for the perfect code would be so complex that its inherent complexities would make it imperfect." 356 Tax expenditures and tax lobbying were also indicted. 357 Contrasting the importance of funding the Cold War with the growth of tax expenditures, Mr. Merle H. Miller complained of a Congress using 351 Id. at 379. 352 Paul, supra note 5 at 416. 353 Bittker, supra note 31 at 237-38. 354 Caplin, supra note 21 at 20-21; 15 U.S.C. § 33(repealed 1970); Bittker, supra note 31at 249. 355 Cahn et al., supra note 28 at 17. 356 M. Miller, supra note 68 at 7. 357 The protest against tax expenditures and other reform rhetoric organized around the concept of a "comprehensive tax base" was analyzed in 1966 by Professor Bittker in "'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax Reform," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967) . the tax code "not only to raise the vast sums we need to maintain . . . a garrison state" but also to address economic and social issues. 358 He argued that special provisions for one group of taxpayers "may well prove a trap . . . for some other unsuspecting taxpayers." 359 He also argued that such special provisions have negative effects on economic competition: "a tax advantage obtained by some scheme, may more than offset the greater production efficiency of a competitor." 360 Similarly, New York City tax lawyer and treatise-author Richard Kilcullen complained of the complications that arise when Congress grants "special tax privilege [s] . . . in favor of a particular group," 361 and Adrian W. DeWind worried about the dangers that tax planning has for business when it distorts activities merely for tax savings. 362 Dean Griswold lamented the increase of "loopholes and special privileges" and "handouts" in the tax codes, specifically identifying those for the oil and gas industry. 363 Mark H. Johnson had a list of problems in the tax system. He said that there were certain pressures that would continue to prevent the development of a "sound system of law and a sound system of administration," including: "lawyers who are economically or spiritually marginal . . . confiscatory tax rates, silly tax laws, . . . revenue agents who have to come up with a deficiency, [and] a silly Court Holding Company rule where, if you take one rule, you come out one way and another, another." 364 He said that "unless you eliminate" these pressures, you are always going to have an unsound tax system. 365 
II. REFLECTIONS
When reviewing the tax ethics literature of this era, it is useful to keep in mind that the authors were practical, professionally accomplished men. Remembering the law firms to which many of these belonged reminds us these were not idealists concerned with abstract notions of professionalism, but men whose practice and clientele were as demanding as any today. 366 Several of the writers mention the client-related pressures in which tax lawyers work. Norris Darrell wrote that the good tax lawyer "must only too often disappoint clients and only too often turn down the fashionable device of the moment," acknowledging the risk that his disappointed clients may "drop off to more daring advisers." 367 "brain child," leaving clients disappointed with the lack of a bag of technical tricks for sale. 368 Randolph E. Paul warned that competitive pressures may tempt the lawyer to "slant opinions in the direction of a client's desires" and away from good judgment. 369 Mr. Paul emphasized the importance of the word "no," and acknowledged that "the client may shop for a more welcome answer in other offices."
370 There is also mention of the importance of office management skills, the importance of being able to work with partners and assistants, 371 and an articulation of the business model for tax specialists. 372 This practical grounding of these writers is especially interesting given their philosophical sensitivities and commitments to duties (such as defending the tax system to clients) that may seem more likely to have been deduced by someone unconcerned with financial, competitive, and practical pressures.
In this practice-oriented content, it initially may be surprising to discover the 1949 tax committee on the importance of natural law. But when the tax committee issued its report, the importance of natural law was not considered to be an academic issue. 373 In the 1930s, the skepticism of the legal realists and positivists had prevailed among legal theorists and lawyers. However, the rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s and 1940s "forced many to think again." 374 The rejection of natural law jurisprudence by German lawyers had been blamed for their legal authorizations of Nazi acts. 375 The result in America was a retreat from both realism and positivism and a revival of natural law jurisprudence. 376 Thus, the tax bar likely had the fear of totalitarianism in mind when it produced its report on natural law, emphasizing the necessity of the objective moral grounding of reliable legal analysis. This historical context reveals the practical concerns behind the report, though the report itself had no practical guidance.
Despite the tax committee's consensus on natural law, the tax lawyers expressed differences on the relationship between law and morals. Both Merle H. Miller and Norris Darrell emphasized the objective continuum between the law and morals, and even claimed a very practical connection between the two. Both explained the important role of a lawyer's moral sense in his daily work. Mr. Miller believed the lawyers and judges shared a moral sense, and he believed that adherence to the moral sense by lawyers and judges would lead them toward the same legal conclusions. 377 Mr. Darrell believed that a sustainable tax plan was one in which legal and moral propriety often shade into one another. 378 Mr. Miller and Mr. Darrell's view was that law and morality are coherent, and that good legal judgment requires good moral judgment. In their view, morality was theoretically objective and practically essential.
In contrast, Randolph E. Paul was convinced that the tax lawyer's moral sense had no place in legal analysis. 379 His concern was that the lawyer's moral sense might be a risk to the client's objective. Interestingly, Mr. Paul explicitly pushes the lawyer away from his moral concerns when providing tax advice in the same context as pushing the lawyer away from his policy concerns. Given Mr. Paul's role as a key tax policy advisor for FDR, 380 it may well be that Mr. Paul was keenly aware of advantages his clients were provided under the tax code that, on policy grounds, he believed should not be available. His emphasis on tax lawyers being involved in tax legislation, even if it was not in the interests of their clients, may evidence this concern.
381 It may well be that Mr. Paul was focusing on tax benefits to which the client's entitlement was certain, warning only that the tax lawyer's personal sense that the law's policy was ill-founded were irrelevant. In contrast, Mr. Miller and Mr. Darrell appear to have been focusing on tax benefits that were uncertain and the importance of an equitable sense when assessing the technicalities of the uncertainties. After all, Mr. Miller, at least, emphasized that the lawyer and judge share this sense and as it guides judges, so it should guide lawyers. Mr. Paul never mentions judges considering these issues, which suggests these would not be the types of issues on which the moral sense of judges would be relevant. Perhaps Mr. Paul was merely arguing that when a tax benefit is certain, the lawyer's moral or political sense against it should not be an impediment to his client claiming it.
government's revenue 388 -and Professor Hellerstein emphasized the duties a lawyer owes to his government as a citizen. 389 This patriotism was no doubt inspired by Cold War threats, but it also reflects the broad support for the mass income tax policy. 390 Even though the highest marginal income tax rates for most of this period were over 90%, 391 and even though during the early 1950s, more than 200 federal tax officials resigned, were removed, and/or were indicted in connection with a string corruption scandals, 392 these tax lawyers presented themselves as patriotic and optimistic supporters of their government and its tax system.
There was considerable agreement among the writers that tax lawyers were in need of moral improvement, 393 as were their clients. 394 It seems likely, and was explicitly mentioned by several, that there could be considerable agreement on the resolution of specific moral problems, even though there might be considerable disagreement on the more abstract issue of whether or not tax lawyers had a special "duty to the system."
395 Indeed, emphasizing the practical rather than theoretical, several of the writers claimed that moral problems need not even be debated in strictly moral terms, as they were convinced that good morals, good lawyering, and good business coincide. 396 The pragmatism of these men led them not only to prefer solving particular problems to arguing theoretically, but also led them to collapse the moral, technical, and business aspects of tax lawyering into what today we might call a "best practices" approach.
Those writers who argued for a special duty for tax lawyers emphasized the self-assessing nature of the system and the need for strong moral principles among the taxpayers in the context of their duties as citizens in a democracy.
397
Professor Maguire mentioned the "high degree of acquiescence and 388 See supra p. 9. 389 See supra p. 10. 390 The broad support was produced by the defeat of the totalitarian regimes in World War II and the post war surge in prosperity. Brownlee, Federal Taxation in America: A Short History 119-120 (2d ed. 2005). This new system had brought big changes in a small period of time: from 1939 to 1945, the number of individual income tax payers increased more than 10-fold (from 3.9 million to 42.6 million). Though the richest 1% accounted for 32% of the income tax revenue, almost 90% of the labor force was now filing income tax returns. Id. at 115-117. In 1940, the income tax accounted for only 16% of all taxes collected at all levels of government, but by 1950 it accounted for more than 51%. The implementation of the new mass tax regime "succeeded because of the popularity of the war effort." The two were connected in the public mind in some part due to a Walt Disney-produced propaganda cartoon starring Donald Duck and watched by more than 32,000,000 theatre-going Americans in 1942. cooperation" needed from both taxpayer and their experts. 398 Norris Darrell phrased it as the duty "to help make our self-assessing income tax system work," 399 which included, in his mind, making it work without requiring police state methods. 400 Merle H. Miller emphasized that the duty to be honest and comply with the democratically-implemented tax system was especially important given the Cold War's demands. 401 Professor Hellerstein argued that a citizen "owes his government and his neighbors" his share of taxes, and that this recognition was necessary to avoiding moral chaos in the tax system.
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In addition to the claims about a general special duty, there were claims about specific duties tax lawyers owed. One commonly cited duty was becoming involved in improving the tax law and its administration. Norris Darrell and Randolph E. Paul both argued that the tax lawyer should be willing to improve the system, even if it meant taking positions contrary to the positions of his clients. 403 Mark H. Johnson made a related but different point, which was that the tax lawyer ought not to work to advance his client's positions through the bar associations but engage only in "disinterested public service" there. 404 A second commonly cited duty was the duty of tax lawyers to educate their clients in an effort to improve their tax morality. Merle H. Miller argued that the tax lawyer ought to increase the layman's respect for the system and always be careful to correct his client's misconceptions. 405 He believed the tax lawyer ought to increase the client's respect for the system and appreciation of honestly complying.
406
Professor Hellerstein argued the tax lawyers' duty to improve tax morality extended beyond his clients and to the community at large. 407 The duty of a tax lawyer as a tax ethics educator (at least for his clients) had wide support among the writers in the period. 408 One wonders what today's tax lawyers would think of such a duty.
Perhaps the debate over whether or not tax lawyers had a special duty to the tax system can be understood, in part, as an effort to identify the benefits tax lawyers provided to the tax system. In some part, the different characterizations of the benefits tax lawyers provided seem to reflect whether the writer was focused on the tax lawyer as a litigator or focused on the tax lawyer as an advisor. Those who focused on litigation emphasized the benefits lawyers provide through the adversarial system. Mark H. Johnson attributed the coherence, uniformity, and equitable nature of the tax law to tax lawyers functioning as adversaries with the government on behalf of their clients. 409 He thought that a client knowing "his advisor is in his corner, and is not in the middle of the ring as a referee" increased the client's support for the tax system and, as a result, reduced the temptation of clients to engage in wholesale tax evasion. 410 Professor Barnes also argued that the tax lawyer, simply by lawyering, makes the tax system more effective. 411 Those who argued for a special duty on tax lawyers were less focused on lawyers-as-adversaries and more focused on lawyers as advisors. For example, Professor Hellerstein focused on advising clients about deductions and preparing transactional documents when arguing for a duty to the system. 412 Norris Darrell argued that the tax lawyer ought to convince the client to behave as he, the lawyer, would when faced with the duty to calculate and report his own tax liabilities. 413 He thought it was important for the tax lawyer to be willing to disappoint the client with his advice. 414 And Merle H. Miller thought the tax lawyer contributed "greatly to the well being of the country at large" by killing off bad tax schemes at inception.
415 Professor Maguire, Thomas N. Tarleau, Norris Darrell, Randolph E. Paul, and Seymour S. Mintz all agreed that tax lawyers engaged in litigation are engaged in an adversarial process not significantly different than others -but that more perplexing ethical issues of tax practice occur outside of the court room. 416 One perplexing issue outside the court room was whether or not to disclose "doubtful but arguable points in a tax return." 417 Only Professor Hellerstein argued for disclosing all positions it was reasonably clear the government would oppose, regardless of the strength of the taxpayer's or government's position. 418 Other writers focused on the quality of the government's anticipated position. Norris Darrell and Randolph E. Paul argued that it is difficult to lay down a general rule, but usually debatable issues should be disclosed unless the debate would arise only because the government was unreasonably stubborn on a given issue. 419 Gerald Wallace took this approach a step further, concluding there should be no duty of disclosure so long as one believed the government's position to be wrong. 420 Making the duty to disclose turn on anticipating the government's response and being able to assess the quality of that response before it is made is a more complicated standard than assessing the quality of one's own position. Mark H. Johnson and Boris Bittker each focused on the assessing one's own position, with Mr. Johnson claiming no disclosure was needed so long as the position was reasonable, and Professor Bittker claiming no disclosure was needed so long as it reflects an honest belief about the tax liability. 421 In addition to the substantive quality of the position, Professor Bittker cited concerns about overwhelming the government with disclosures, and the difficulty in defining the lines of a general duty of disclosure. 422 His concern was that the lofty rhetoric of taxpayers actively cooperating with the government should be checked by the likelihood of unintended consequences. The discussion of the duty of disclosure highlights the complexity of the tax lawyer's role in a self-assessing system -the need to self-assess the quality of one's own legal advice, the need to assess the quality of the government's anticipated legal response, and the administrative needs and limits of the system. Notably, no one alleged that an adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the government meant that the government had no right to demand disclosure or that the taxpayer had the right to engage in the audit lottery.
There was wide agreement that there was no special duty on tax lawyers who were litigating. But Borris Bittker, 423 Mark J. Johnson, 424 and Professor John Potts Barnes 425 were adamant that there was no special duty on tax lawyers in any situations, and Randolph E. Paul, though not "adamant" about the lack of such special duty, thought it was rather doubtful. 426 None of these lawyers, however, should be understood as arguing for a low ethical standard. Indeed, their concern was quite different. They argued that all lawyers are subject to high ethical standards, and to claim that tax lawyers are subject to especially high standards runs the risk of implying other lawyers are subject to lesser standards. Their concern was to defend the ethical integrity of the bar as a whole, worrying that characterizing tax lawyers as having special ethical concerns made too much of a difference between tax lawyers and other members of the bar. From this perspective, the debate over a special duty of tax lawyers reflects an interesting tension between those authors who emphasized the similarities between tax lawyers and other lawyers, and those who emphasized the differences between different types of lawyers. Was the tax lawyer a tax professional who happened to be lawyer, or a lawyer who happened to have tax expertise? One wonders how much this discussion indirectly reflected concerns over how the tax field ought to be divided between lawyers and accountants. During this period, accountants were being accused of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law for tax-related work, 427 lawyers who were also accountants were forbidden from practicing both professions, 428 and, as Dean Griswold put it "the two great professions of law and accountancy were squared away for a battle royal." 429 Perhaps this battle with accountants persuaded those who denied any special duty on tax lawyers to do so as an effort to establish that tax lawyers were not only primarily but essentially and exclusively lawyers, sharing professional commonalities with all the other members of the bar but no other profession. Tax lawyering was lawyering, and only tax lawyers were authorized to do it, was perhaps the subsurface theme. Interestingly, within only a couple of years, Randolph E. Paul, one of the most influential tax lawyers during this time, switched his emphasis from the differences between tax lawyers and other lawyers to the similarity between the two. Perhaps this shift was influenced in some part by his sensitivity to this inter-professional debate, and his lending his period in which these lawyers were writing. 444 Indeed, some of the lawyers called for increased efforts of exactly this sort. Professor Maguire called for "marching orders" from the bar or Treasury Department for "a number of commonplace situations produced by tax practice," and his call was echoed by Norris Darrel and Mortimer Caplin. 445 The tax lawyers writing in 1945-1965 were sketching their personal approaches on ethical issues without having to consider, or having the benefit of considering, much sustained corporate reflection and articulation. It is interesting that they also sketched their ethical approaches without significant reference to either the ABA canon of professional ethics or any state bar's rules; today it would be unthinkable that a lawyer would seriously analyze professional ethics issues without using the ethics rules as rules. Perhaps the boldness with which some of these older approaches were expressed is attributable to the then wide-open range of the discussion, unbounded by much formal guidance or regulation, much bar committee work, or much interest in formal ethics rules. Their bold and open discussion preceded the evolution of legal ethics into the law of lawyering, 446 and it shows.
One is left to ponder the perspective of these earlier tax lawyers with their earlier understanding of professional ethics would have on many of today's issues. With their philosophical concern for the relationship between law and morals, and how would they perceive the orientation of the discourse on the technical regulation of the profession by the Treasury Department? 447 With their interest in improving both the tax savings and the tax morality of their clients, how would they perceive the attacks and defenses of tax shelter lawyering? 448 With their emphasis on providing solid tax advice, what would they make of today's opinion and disclosure standards? 449 If they had witnessed the last half-century's developments of tax law, tax lawyering and tax law administration, how would their ideas of the duty to the system have developed? 450 Given their love of country and their experience of the Cold War and near-confiscatory tax rates, how would they react to today's anti-tax rhetoric during the "War on Terror" and much, much lower rates? While it is interesting to ponder how the tax lawyers of more than half century ago would consider us today, it is perhaps more interesting to ponder how the tax lawyers of 2065 will.
